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Appendix 1 - What Can Go Wrong - Seven Major Flaws Which Threaten Stability |
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Appendix 1 - What Can Go Wrong - Seven Major Flaws Which Threaten Stability
Many flaws in our Constitution share a common source - all arise because in practice our Government operates under democratic but unwritten rules which are contradicted by the undemocratic but written rules of the Constitution.
Until 1975, the unwritten rules which make our system democratic were seen as supplementing and limiting the scope of the written rules. In the 1975 Constitutional crisis the side which played by the written rules was victorious. The unwritten rules were shown to be subordinate. Compliance with them is optional.
To resolve disputes, you need an agreed set of rules. Think of any sporting contest. Imagine what would happen if each side played by different rules. That is the position with our political system. Since 1975, in every significant political dispute, we have faced the possibility that one side will play by the rules which have usually operated in practice, while its opponent plays by the quite different rules written into the Constitution.
This fundamental problem has been concealed by our relative good fortune. Our political disputes, while intense, have not induced the participants to resort to extreme measures. But that could change at any time, as we face challenges such as climate change, global food shortages, more frequent natural disasters, an assertive Communist China, the spread of antibiotic resistant diseases, and so on. A crisis over any of these issues could provide the catalyst for extreme positions to be adopted.
Set out below are seven major flaws which threaten our stability and an outline of how each flaw could have been manifested in the recent past or could eventuate in the near future. Those who peddle the fantasy that we have a good Constitution may dismiss the scenarios as far-fetched. No doubt they would have dismissed the possibility of the 1975 crisis before it occurred. These scenarios are possible and many variations on the scenarios can be envisaged. Acceptance of the Advancing Democracy model would make each of them impossible.
Conservatives are happy with the Constitution because they tacitly assume that it will always work against Labor. This is simply wishful thinking. The scenarios demonstrate how the Liberal / National Coalition could easily become victims of our archaic Constitution.
Flaw No. 1
The Constitution is undemocratic in that it omits any guarantee that the majority party in the House of Representatives will always form the Government. This permits the will of the majority to be thwarted.
Scenario 1 : (many variations are possible)
After the 2010 election, Labor formed a minority Government. Consider what would have happened if the following events had occurred before the 2013 election.
To strengthen its position, Labor appoints a new Governor-General who is a reliable party supporter.
Labor then loses three members of the House of Representatives due to ill-health, death and/or scandal. Their seats are won at by-elections by Liberals. The Liberal / National Coalition then holds the majority in the House, which passes a resolution calling on the Governor-General to appoint its leader as the Prime Minister.
The Governor-General refuses, claiming the Government is in the middle of implementing policies vital for Australia’s future and needs more time to finish the job. This is permitted by the written Constitution.
The Liberal leader asks the Queen to appoint a different Governor-General, one who will follow Constitutional convention and appoint the majority leader as Prime Minister. But the Queen refuses, following firstly the long-standing convention that she takes advice only from the Prime Minister, and secondly the 1975 precedent that Australia’s Constitutional problems are for Australians to resolve.
The minority Labor Prime Minister continues in office until the end of the 3 year term. Economic conditions having improved, the party does much better at the 2013 election; perhaps winning. The will of the majority in the House of Representatives has been successfully thwarted.
In fact, the majority of our representatives can be thwarted at any time. Following an election, there is no obligation to appoint the winner as Prime Minister. The election loser can be appointed until circumstances are more favourable to the loser, who then calls a new election and wins. People may complain that the will of the people at the prior election has been ignored, but as in 1975 (when the 1974 result was disregarded) the Prime Minister and Governor-General can argue ‘What is undemocratic about having another election?’
The solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, the Government is effectively appointed by the majority in the House of Representatives. No-one can be appointed without such support: proposed section 64A.
Flaw No.2
The Constitution is undemocratic in that it permits the minority which lost the election but which controls the Senate to prevent the majority which won the election from governing, and to force the majority to an early election when it is electorally unpopular. The weapon the minority uses is the Senate’s power to withhold the supply of money to the Government.
Scenario 2: (many variations are possible)
Measures to alleviate climate change were implemented in 2012, and a new Liberal Government pledged to remove them was elected in 2013. That Government faces a hostile Senate, dominated by the Greens and Labor, until 30th June 2014, and a potentially hostile Senate thereafter; though perhaps not till after the 2016 election. While the Government remains popular, the Senate delays but ultimately passes the new Government’s legislation, such as the law to repeal the carbon tax. Then when the Government’s popularity fades, it refuses to pass the next budget until the Government commits to new measures to reduce human-induced climate change. The Senate has the power to do this in the written Constitution.
The Government, relying on the unwritten convention that Government is formed by the majority in the lower house, refuses to change its position.
The Labor / Green Senate majority calls on the Governor-General to remove a Government which cannot obtain the supply of funds it needs to govern.
The Governor-General, following the 1975 precedent, dismisses the Liberal Government, even though it holds a clear majority in the House of Representatives. A Labor Prime Minister is appointed, who advises the Governor-General to hold an immediate election, which Labor wins.
The Solution:
The Advancing Democracy model prevents the appointment of a Prime Minister who does not hold majority support in the House of Representatives - see proposed s.64A - and prevents an early election being called unless the House of Representatives votes to hold one: proposed s.58A(iii)(a). The Senate’s power over money bills would remain unchanged, so a hostile Senate majority could still, theoretically, withhold supply. But it could no longer force a resolution of the deadlock in its favour, by forcing the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the holding of a new election. For the Senate to bring government to a standstill without an achievable objective when the Constitution now makes it clear the majority has the right to govern would invite condemnation by the electorate. Its power to withhold supply for the purpose of throwing out a Government would become unusable, while its power to reject or defer individual money bills (which might discriminate against particular States, for example) would survive.
Flaw No. 3
The Constitution is undemocratic in that the power to appoint the Government is vested in an unelected individual who is not responsible to Parliament or accountable to the electorate.
Scenario 3: (many variations are possible)
In 2013 a Liberal Government was elected on a pledge to stop the unauthorised entry into Australian waters of boats carrying persons claiming to be refugees.
Following a series of natural disasters causing famine in impoverished Asian countries, and / or political upheavals in Burma, Bangla Desh or Indonesia which result in the persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, Governments in those countries start assisting huge numbers of people to migrate to Australia by boat (in the same way that Castro exported the Cubans he did not want to Florida in the early 1980s).
The Liberal Government resorts to increasingly cruel measures which result in the death of many boat people, and naval personnel. Australia is subjected to sanctions by other countries, and threatened with military retaliation. Some Liberal MPs object to the policy.
The Governor-General intervenes to appoint a new Prime Minister from the ruling Liberal / National Coalition in place of its leader - one who will stop the deaths and placate foreign governments.
The Governor-General then prorogues (suspends) Parliament under s.5 of the Constitution to avoid the new Prime Minister being defeated on the floor of the House.
Government policy and the Government itself is therefore changed on the initiative of the unelected representative of a foreign Queen, rather than by the decision of elected members of Parliament.
The Solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, the elected House of Representatives alone determines who governs: see proposed s.64A.
Flaw No. 4
The Constitution is undemocratic in that an obstructive Senate can, with assistance from a compliant Governor-General, force the House of Representatives to face an early election without the Senate itself having to face an election and be judged for its actions.
Scenario 4: (many variations are possible)
A Liberal Government is elected, but it does not control the Senate. After a prolonged period of Senate obstruction, with all or most bills being rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General dissolves the House of Representatives and forces it alone to face the voters. The voters can support or change the Government, but cannot change the Senate.
The Solution:
The Advancing Democracy model solves this problem partly, but not fully. It does not stop Senate obstruction, or provide a means of forcing the Senate to an election, but by removing the Governor-General’s power to dissolve the House of Representatives, except with the consent of the House - proposed s.58A(iii)(a) - it prevents the Senate from forcing the House to an early election.
Flaw No. 5
The Constitution is undemocratic in that the powers of an unelected Governor-General and Queen can be used to prevent proposed laws passed by the democratically elected Houses of Parliament from becoming law.
Scenario 5: (many variations are possible)
A carbon tax was implemented in 2012, but the new Liberal Government elected in 2013 succeeds in having Parliament pass the repealing legislation. It then relies on the current practice concerning assent to legislation and asks the Governor-General to sign the legislation into law. But as it does so, a series of climate disasters occurs. The Governor-General, who is profoundly concerned about climate change, relies on s.58 of the current Constitution and withholds his or her assent. The legislation for which the Government has a mandate and which is supported by a majority of both Houses does not become law. (The Governor-General could then forestall his or her own dismissal by first dismissing the Prime Minister, as Sir John Kerr did in 1975.)
The Solution:
The Advancing Democracy model abolishes the power to assent and to withhold assent. The only requirement for the making of a new law will be that the law is passed by a majority of both Houses of Parliament: see proposed s.56A. The Queen will no longer be a part of Parliament.
Flaw No. 6
The Constitution is undemocratic in that while executive power is in practice usually exercised by an elected Prime Minister and Cabinet, the written Constitution vests executive powers in an unelected Governor-General.
Scenario 6: (many variations are possible)
The majority Liberal / National coalition forms Government, and makes a controversial decision to send troops to support America in another war. There is widespread public opposition to the war, and the Governor-General shares this concern. Citing his / her position as commander in chief of the armed forces under section 68 of the Constitution, the Governor-General declines to co-operate and refuses to issue orders to the military. If the Government then orders the military to fight and its commander in chief contradicts the order, who does the military obey? As the dispute becomes protracted, the Governor-General appoints to the Executive Council, either from inside or outside Parliament, people opposed to the deployment of the troops, using the power in s.62 of the current Constitution. The new ministers’ advice not to support the war makes the Governor-General’s position legally impregnable - see Drafting Notes 68.2 to 68.11 for s.68. At a suitable point the Governor-General can threaten the Government’s hold on power by dissolving the House of Representatives under s.5, claiming this will ‘let the people decide’.
The Solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, executive power is not split between two entities. The only entity which has power over the military is the Government: see proposed s.61A and 62A(v). The Government is comprised of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister chosen by the House of Representative majority and the Ministers chosen by the Prime Minister: proposed s.61A and s.64A.
Flaw No. 7
The Constitution is undemocratic in that ill-defined and antiquated prerogative and reserve powers of the Crown may be misused by the executive Government to the disadvantage of Parliament.
Scenario 7: (many variations are possible)
The governing majority in House of Representatives is in danger of losing its majority. Before its support can be tested by a vote in the House, the Governor-General (under s.5 of the Constitution) either directs the House not to sit, or prorogues Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister who is losing support. The prorogation suspends all Parliamentary functions. The Prime Minister remains in power, with no Parliamentary scrutiny beyond the minimum necessary under the Constitution - one sitting day a year.
The solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, the House of Representatives will determine when it meets and the Senate will determine when it meets: see proposed section 6A. The concept of proroguing (or suspending) Parliament will be abolished.
It would be unusual for a scenario which exposes the Constitution’s flaws to be as simple and as straightforward as those set out above. Usually there will be complications, and an atmosphere of crisis, either real or artificially generated by those who would benefit from there being a crisis. For example:
▸ Consider how much more plausible Scenario 1 would have seemed if another global financial crisis had appeared imminent, and the Liberals’ economic plans were perceived by economists and business people to be deficient.
▸ Scenario 6 becomes more plausible if at a recent election the governing party had lead the voters to believe it would not send troops overseas; or if retired senior military officers are publicly opposing the deployment.
At times of apparent crisis there are many who assert that there must be ‘emergency’ powers available to deal with the crisis. The unrestricted powers of the Crown are a ready source of such powers.
The Constitution contains multiple flaws. There is not one section worth retaining in its present form. The seven flaws above are simply those most likely to cause instability during the next few years.
Some argue that these flaws are in fact virtues - that the powers of the Queen’s representative are ‘checks and balances’ on damaging actions which may be taken by the elected Government. This argument is intellectually shallow and unsustainable.
▸ If the Crown was intended to be some sort of umpire, the Constitution would contain clear criteria by which the Governor-General could judge whether intervention in Government affairs or removal of the Government was warranted. The Constitution contains no such criteria.
▸ If the power of the Crown was intended to be a check or balance, the Governor-General would have some security of tenure in the position. But this is entirely absent. The Queen appoints the nominee of the Prime Minister. The ‘checks and balances’ can be avoided by appointing a ‘tame’ Governor-General who will do as the Prime Minister wishes.
If the present Constitution remains unchanged, then this is the logical step for the Prime Minister to take as a crisis approaches. It is the only measure a democratically elected Prime Minister can take to protect his or her Government. The 1999 referendum proposed destroying this protection, while retaining all the undemocratic flaws of the present system. (That is why the author voted ‘No’ in 1999).
Remove the monarchy and you remove the flaws. It is time to discard the decaying, royalist foundation of our Constitution, and replace it with a new foundation of democratic principle.
Go to next Appendix |
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Appendix 1 - What Can Go Wrong - Seven Major Flaws Which Threaten Stability
Many flaws in our Constitution share a common source - all arise because in practice our Government operates under democratic but unwritten rules which are contradicted by the undemocratic but written rules of the Constitution.
Until 1975, the unwritten rules which make our system democratic were seen as supplementing and limiting the scope of the written rules. In the 1975 Constitutional crisis the side which played by the written rules was victorious. The unwritten rules were shown to be subordinate. Compliance with them is optional.
To resolve disputes, you need an agreed set of rules. Think of any sporting contest. Imagine what would happen if each side played by different rules. That is the position with our political system. Since 1975, in every significant political dispute, we have faced the possibility that one side will play by the rules which have usually operated in practice, while its opponent plays by the quite different rules written into the Constitution.
This fundamental problem has been concealed by our relative good fortune. Our political disputes, while intense, have not induced the participants to resort to extreme measures. But that could change at any time, as we face challenges such as climate change, global food shortages, more frequent natural disasters, an assertive Communist China, the spread of antibiotic resistant diseases, and so on. A crisis over any of these issues could provide the catalyst for extreme positions to be adopted.
Set out below are seven major flaws which threaten our stability and an outline of how each flaw could have been manifested in the recent past or could eventuate in the near future. Those who peddle the fantasy that we have a good Constitution may dismiss the scenarios as far-fetched. No doubt they would have dismissed the possibility of the 1975 crisis before it occurred. These scenarios are possible and many variations on the scenarios can be envisaged. Acceptance of the Advancing Democracy model would make each of them impossible.
Conservatives are happy with the Constitution because they tacitly assume that it will always work against Labor. This is simply wishful thinking. The scenarios demonstrate how the Liberal / National Coalition could easily become victims of our archaic Constitution.
Flaw No. 1
The Constitution is undemocratic in that it omits any guarantee that the majority party in the House of Representatives will always form the Government. This permits the will of the majority to be thwarted.
Scenario 1 : (many variations are possible)
After the 2010 election, Labor formed a minority Government. Consider what would have happened if the following events had occurred before the 2013 election.
To strengthen its position, Labor appoints a new Governor-General who is a reliable party supporter.
Labor then loses three members of the House of Representatives due to ill-health, death and/or scandal. Their seats are won at by-elections by Liberals. The Liberal / National Coalition then holds the majority in the House, which passes a resolution calling on the Governor-General to appoint its leader as the Prime Minister.
The Governor-General refuses, claiming the Government is in the middle of implementing policies vital for Australia’s future and needs more time to finish the job. This is permitted by the written Constitution.
The Liberal leader asks the Queen to appoint a different Governor-General, one who will follow Constitutional convention and appoint the majority leader as Prime Minister. But the Queen refuses, following firstly the long-standing convention that she takes advice only from the Prime Minister, and secondly the 1975 precedent that Australia’s Constitutional problems are for Australians to resolve.
The minority Labor Prime Minister continues in office until the end of the 3 year term. Economic conditions having improved, the party does much better at the 2013 election; perhaps winning. The will of the majority in the House of Representatives has been successfully thwarted.
In fact, the majority of our representatives can be thwarted at any time. Following an election, there is no obligation to appoint the winner as Prime Minister. The election loser can be appointed until circumstances are more favourable to the loser, who then calls a new election and wins. People may complain that the will of the people at the prior election has been ignored, but as in 1975 (when the 1974 result was disregarded) the Prime Minister and Governor-General can argue ‘What is undemocratic about having another election?’
The solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, the Government is effectively appointed by the majority in the House of Representatives. No-one can be appointed without such support: proposed section 64A.
Flaw No.2
The Constitution is undemocratic in that it permits the minority which lost the election but which controls the Senate to prevent the majority which won the election from governing, and to force the majority to an early election when it is electorally unpopular. The weapon the minority uses is the Senate’s power to withhold the supply of money to the Government.
Scenario 2: (many variations are possible)
Measures to alleviate climate change were implemented in 2012, and a new Liberal Government pledged to remove them was elected in 2013. That Government faces a hostile Senate, dominated by the Greens and Labor, until 30th June 2014, and a potentially hostile Senate thereafter; though perhaps not till after the 2016 election. While the Government remains popular, the Senate delays but ultimately passes the new Government’s legislation, such as the law to repeal the carbon tax. Then when the Government’s popularity fades, it refuses to pass the next budget until the Government commits to new measures to reduce human-induced climate change. The Senate has the power to do this in the written Constitution.
The Government, relying on the unwritten convention that Government is formed by the majority in the lower house, refuses to change its position.
The Labor / Green Senate majority calls on the Governor-General to remove a Government which cannot obtain the supply of funds it needs to govern.
The Governor-General, following the 1975 precedent, dismisses the Liberal Government, even though it holds a clear majority in the House of Representatives. A Labor Prime Minister is appointed, who advises the Governor-General to hold an immediate election, which Labor wins.
The Solution:
The Advancing Democracy model prevents the appointment of a Prime Minister who does not hold majority support in the House of Representatives - see proposed s.64A - and prevents an early election being called unless the House of Representatives votes to hold one: proposed s.58A(iii)(a). The Senate’s power over money bills would remain unchanged, so a hostile Senate majority could still, theoretically, withhold supply. But it could no longer force a resolution of the deadlock in its favour, by forcing the dismissal of the Prime Minister and the holding of a new election. For the Senate to bring government to a standstill without an achievable objective when the Constitution now makes it clear the majority has the right to govern would invite condemnation by the electorate. Its power to withhold supply for the purpose of throwing out a Government would become unusable, while its power to reject or defer individual money bills (which might discriminate against particular States, for example) would survive.
Flaw No. 3
The Constitution is undemocratic in that the power to appoint the Government is vested in an unelected individual who is not responsible to Parliament or accountable to the electorate.
Scenario 3: (many variations are possible)
In 2013 a Liberal Government was elected on a pledge to stop the unauthorised entry into Australian waters of boats carrying persons claiming to be refugees.
Following a series of natural disasters causing famine in impoverished Asian countries, and / or political upheavals in Burma, Bangla Desh or Indonesia which result in the persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, Governments in those countries start assisting huge numbers of people to migrate to Australia by boat (in the same way that Castro exported the Cubans he did not want to Florida in the early 1980s).
The Liberal Government resorts to increasingly cruel measures which result in the death of many boat people, and naval personnel. Australia is subjected to sanctions by other countries, and threatened with military retaliation. Some Liberal MPs object to the policy.
The Governor-General intervenes to appoint a new Prime Minister from the ruling Liberal / National Coalition in place of its leader - one who will stop the deaths and placate foreign governments.
The Governor-General then prorogues (suspends) Parliament under s.5 of the Constitution to avoid the new Prime Minister being defeated on the floor of the House.
Government policy and the Government itself is therefore changed on the initiative of the unelected representative of a foreign Queen, rather than by the decision of elected members of Parliament.
The Solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, the elected House of Representatives alone determines who governs: see proposed s.64A.
Flaw No. 4
The Constitution is undemocratic in that an obstructive Senate can, with assistance from a compliant Governor-General, force the House of Representatives to face an early election without the Senate itself having to face an election and be judged for its actions.
Scenario 4: (many variations are possible)
A Liberal Government is elected, but it does not control the Senate. After a prolonged period of Senate obstruction, with all or most bills being rejected by the Senate, the Governor-General dissolves the House of Representatives and forces it alone to face the voters. The voters can support or change the Government, but cannot change the Senate.
The Solution:
The Advancing Democracy model solves this problem partly, but not fully. It does not stop Senate obstruction, or provide a means of forcing the Senate to an election, but by removing the Governor-General’s power to dissolve the House of Representatives, except with the consent of the House - proposed s.58A(iii)(a) - it prevents the Senate from forcing the House to an early election.
Flaw No. 5
The Constitution is undemocratic in that the powers of an unelected Governor-General and Queen can be used to prevent proposed laws passed by the democratically elected Houses of Parliament from becoming law.
Scenario 5: (many variations are possible)
A carbon tax was implemented in 2012, but the new Liberal Government elected in 2013 succeeds in having Parliament pass the repealing legislation. It then relies on the current practice concerning assent to legislation and asks the Governor-General to sign the legislation into law. But as it does so, a series of climate disasters occurs. The Governor-General, who is profoundly concerned about climate change, relies on s.58 of the current Constitution and withholds his or her assent. The legislation for which the Government has a mandate and which is supported by a majority of both Houses does not become law. (The Governor-General could then forestall his or her own dismissal by first dismissing the Prime Minister, as Sir John Kerr did in 1975.)
The Solution:
The Advancing Democracy model abolishes the power to assent and to withhold assent. The only requirement for the making of a new law will be that the law is passed by a majority of both Houses of Parliament: see proposed s.56A. The Queen will no longer be a part of Parliament.
Flaw No. 6
The Constitution is undemocratic in that while executive power is in practice usually exercised by an elected Prime Minister and Cabinet, the written Constitution vests executive powers in an unelected Governor-General.
Scenario 6: (many variations are possible)
The majority Liberal / National coalition forms Government, and makes a controversial decision to send troops to support America in another war. There is widespread public opposition to the war, and the Governor-General shares this concern. Citing his / her position as commander in chief of the armed forces under section 68 of the Constitution, the Governor-General declines to co-operate and refuses to issue orders to the military. If the Government then orders the military to fight and its commander in chief contradicts the order, who does the military obey? As the dispute becomes protracted, the Governor-General appoints to the Executive Council, either from inside or outside Parliament, people opposed to the deployment of the troops, using the power in s.62 of the current Constitution. The new ministers’ advice not to support the war makes the Governor-General’s position legally impregnable - see Drafting Notes 68.2 to 68.11 for s.68. At a suitable point the Governor-General can threaten the Government’s hold on power by dissolving the House of Representatives under s.5, claiming this will ‘let the people decide’.
The Solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, executive power is not split between two entities. The only entity which has power over the military is the Government: see proposed s.61A and 62A(v). The Government is comprised of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister chosen by the House of Representative majority and the Ministers chosen by the Prime Minister: proposed s.61A and s.64A.
Flaw No. 7
The Constitution is undemocratic in that ill-defined and antiquated prerogative and reserve powers of the Crown may be misused by the executive Government to the disadvantage of Parliament.
Scenario 7: (many variations are possible)
The governing majority in House of Representatives is in danger of losing its majority. Before its support can be tested by a vote in the House, the Governor-General (under s.5 of the Constitution) either directs the House not to sit, or prorogues Parliament on the advice of the Prime Minister who is losing support. The prorogation suspends all Parliamentary functions. The Prime Minister remains in power, with no Parliamentary scrutiny beyond the minimum necessary under the Constitution - one sitting day a year.
The solution:
Under the Advancing Democracy model, the House of Representatives will determine when it meets and the Senate will determine when it meets: see proposed section 6A. The concept of proroguing (or suspending) Parliament will be abolished.
It would be unusual for a scenario which exposes the Constitution’s flaws to be as simple and as straightforward as those set out above. Usually there will be complications, and an atmosphere of crisis, either real or artificially generated by those who would benefit from there being a crisis. For example:
▸ Consider how much more plausible Scenario 1 would have seemed if another global financial crisis had appeared imminent, and the Liberals’ economic plans were perceived by economists and business people to be deficient.
▸ Scenario 6 becomes more plausible if at a recent election the governing party had lead the voters to believe it would not send troops overseas; or if retired senior military officers are publicly opposing the deployment.
At times of apparent crisis there are many who assert that there must be ‘emergency’ powers available to deal with the crisis. The unrestricted powers of the Crown are a ready source of such powers.
The Constitution contains multiple flaws. There is not one section worth retaining in its present form. The seven flaws above are simply those most likely to cause instability during the next few years.
Some argue that these flaws are in fact virtues - that the powers of the Queen’s representative are ‘checks and balances’ on damaging actions which may be taken by the elected Government. This argument is intellectually shallow and unsustainable.
▸ If the Crown was intended to be some sort of umpire, the Constitution would contain clear criteria by which the Governor-General could judge whether intervention in Government affairs or removal of the Government was warranted. The Constitution contains no such criteria.
▸ If the power of the Crown was intended to be a check or balance, the Governor-General would have some security of tenure in the position. But this is entirely absent. The Queen appoints the nominee of the Prime Minister. The ‘checks and balances’ can be avoided by appointing a ‘tame’ Governor-General who will do as the Prime Minister wishes.
If the present Constitution remains unchanged, then this is the logical step for the Prime Minister to take as a crisis approaches. It is the only measure a democratically elected Prime Minister can take to protect his or her Government. The 1999 referendum proposed destroying this protection, while retaining all the undemocratic flaws of the present system. (That is why the author voted ‘No’ in 1999).
Remove the monarchy and you remove the flaws. It is time to discard the decaying, royalist foundation of our Constitution, and replace it with a new foundation of democratic principle.
Go to next Appendix |
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