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Chapter 10 - Method of Appointment of the Governor-General |
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Chapter 10 - Method of Appointment of the Governor-General
The 1999 Proposal
In the 1999 referendum, Australians were asked whether they favoured a proposal to constitute an Australian republic with a President appointed by Parliament.
Though opinion polls at the time suggested fewer than 10% of Australians wished to retain the Queen as our Head of State, only 45.1% voted ‘Yes’ to the republic, and no State recorded a majority vote in favour. (The figures are drawn from Williams & Hume, People Power, 2010, UNSW Press p.194.)
A significant reason for the defeat of the proposal was dissatisfaction with the method of appointment of the new President.
In 1999, the republicans suggested a role for the President which was very similar to the current role of the Governor-General. Accordingly they suggested a minimal change to the method of appointment. Currently our Governor-General is appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. (This is another non-binding convention. Don’t try to find it in the written Constitution. Instead s.2 gives the Queen complete freedom to appoint whoever she wants). The proposed method of appointment in 1999 was by a resolution supported by a two thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament.
The ‘direct-electionists’ opposed this. They said the voters, not their elected representatives, should choose the President.
A different model
The Advancing Democracy model is not like the 1999 model. It does not propose a substitute monarch as our Head of State. The job description is very different. The model proposes a very precise and limited role for the Governor-General and his or her Deputy. The principal role is to preside over sessions of the Houses of Parliament and make them workable. That is why the formal title for the positions will be Governor-General of Parliament and Deputy Governor-General of Parliament: see proposed ss.58A to 60A.
Why direct election is inadvisable
Consider the qualities necessary for the Governor-General to successfully discharge this role. He or she will need to be an excellent chairperson - a fair but firm figure of authority. Such a person needs an encyclopedic knowledge of the rules of debate - the Standing Orders of each House of Parliament - and the ability to intervene in debates without dominating them or humiliating the participants. The job needs someone who is quick-witted and intelligent, yet not so vain that he or she wants to be the centre of attention. The focus should be on Parliamentary business, not the presiding officer. The Governor-General will need consistency and courage. We need someone who can cut in on a rambling Minister and say:
“Minister - did you understand the question? Then please answer it immediately, or I’ll require you to resume your seat.”
Most voters will not be able to judge whether a person is suitable to be the Governor-General or Deputy. When we vote at elections, we assess what the candidates stand for, what they promise to do, and their competence. With the proposed Governor-General’s position, these provide no guide at all to whether a person could do the job.
▸ What the candidate stands for: This simply does not matter. The only part of the role where independent decision-making will be required is the interpretation of the rules of debate and the management of Parliamentary business. Every other part of the role will involve following the instructions of the House of Representatives.
▸ What the candidate promises to do: With such a limited role, all candidates will promise to be politically neutral. What other promises could be made? None.
▸ Competence: The voters are unlikely to be able to assess in advance a candidate’s competence as chairperson. Firstly, voters do not routinely attend formal meetings where controversial matters are discussed. Few develop knowledge of what makes a good chairperson. Secondly, Parliament is a unique forum. It is not like chairing the meeting of a community group or a company shareholders’ meeting. Thirdly, the qualities of a good chairperson are not ordinarily on display outside of formal meetings. Competence in another field or profession is no guide to whether someone will be a good chairperson.
As with other important positions, such as High Court judges, the public is not in a position to judge who should be the Governor-General and Deputy.
And there would be a considerable disadvantage in selecting the positions by direct election of the voters. How would an under-performing Governor-General or Deputy be removed? At elections, candidates are chosen to serve for a specific period of time. If the person chosen cannot control Parliament, we will have to wait for the period to expire, leaving Parliament dysfunctional in the meantime.
Appointment should be by each House of Parliament
The primary role of the Governor-General and Deputy suggests the method of selection. As the role is to preside over Parliament, they should be chosen by Parliament. Members of Parliament will be in the best position to judge whether the person is running debates smoothly and impartially.
For the Governor-General, the method of appointment set out in proposed s.58B is:
“The Governor-General:
(i) Shall be appointed for a term which expires no later than six months after the date of polling for the next general election of Members of the House; and
(ii) May be removed prior to the expiry of that term;
by a resolution passed by two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives who vote on the resolution. ”
For the Deputy Governor-General, the method of appointment set out in proposed s.59B is:
"The Deputy Governor-General:
(i) Shall be appointed for a term which expires no later than six months after the earliest polling day determined by the States for the next Senate election, whether that be an election for the whole Senate or half the Senate; and
(ii) May be removed prior to the expiry of that term;
by a resolution passed by two-thirds of the members of the Senate who vote on the resolution. ”
The two thirds requirement ensures that a candidate must be acceptable to a broad cross-section of Parliamentarians, not just the party which holds the majority. Removal of an incompetent Head of State can be achieved swiftly, if there is a consensus the incumbent has failed. With the House choosing the Governor-General and the Senate choosing the Deputy, power is spread between the two Houses, while confirming the Senate’s subordinate status.
Go to next chapter |
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Chapter 10 - Method of Appointment of the Governor-General
The 1999 Proposal
In the 1999 referendum, Australians were asked whether they favoured a proposal to constitute an Australian republic with a President appointed by Parliament.
Though opinion polls at the time suggested fewer than 10% of Australians wished to retain the Queen as our Head of State, only 45.1% voted ‘Yes’ to the republic, and no State recorded a majority vote in favour. (The figures are drawn from Williams & Hume, People Power, 2010, UNSW Press p.194.)
A significant reason for the defeat of the proposal was dissatisfaction with the method of appointment of the new President.
In 1999, the republicans suggested a role for the President which was very similar to the current role of the Governor-General. Accordingly they suggested a minimal change to the method of appointment. Currently our Governor-General is appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. (This is another non-binding convention. Don’t try to find it in the written Constitution. Instead s.2 gives the Queen complete freedom to appoint whoever she wants). The proposed method of appointment in 1999 was by a resolution supported by a two thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament.
The ‘direct-electionists’ opposed this. They said the voters, not their elected representatives, should choose the President.
A different model
The Advancing Democracy model is not like the 1999 model. It does not propose a substitute monarch as our Head of State. The job description is very different. The model proposes a very precise and limited role for the Governor-General and his or her Deputy. The principal role is to preside over sessions of the Houses of Parliament and make them workable. That is why the formal title for the positions will be Governor-General of Parliament and Deputy Governor-General of Parliament: see proposed ss.58A to 60A.
Why direct election is inadvisable
Consider the qualities necessary for the Governor-General to successfully discharge this role. He or she will need to be an excellent chairperson - a fair but firm figure of authority. Such a person needs an encyclopedic knowledge of the rules of debate - the Standing Orders of each House of Parliament - and the ability to intervene in debates without dominating them or humiliating the participants. The job needs someone who is quick-witted and intelligent, yet not so vain that he or she wants to be the centre of attention. The focus should be on Parliamentary business, not the presiding officer. The Governor-General will need consistency and courage. We need someone who can cut in on a rambling Minister and say:
“Minister - did you understand the question? Then please answer it immediately, or I’ll require you to resume your seat.”
Most voters will not be able to judge whether a person is suitable to be the Governor-General or Deputy. When we vote at elections, we assess what the candidates stand for, what they promise to do, and their competence. With the proposed Governor-General’s position, these provide no guide at all to whether a person could do the job.
▸ What the candidate stands for: This simply does not matter. The only part of the role where independent decision-making will be required is the interpretation of the rules of debate and the management of Parliamentary business. Every other part of the role will involve following the instructions of the House of Representatives.
▸ What the candidate promises to do: With such a limited role, all candidates will promise to be politically neutral. What other promises could be made? None.
▸ Competence: The voters are unlikely to be able to assess in advance a candidate’s competence as chairperson. Firstly, voters do not routinely attend formal meetings where controversial matters are discussed. Few develop knowledge of what makes a good chairperson. Secondly, Parliament is a unique forum. It is not like chairing the meeting of a community group or a company shareholders’ meeting. Thirdly, the qualities of a good chairperson are not ordinarily on display outside of formal meetings. Competence in another field or profession is no guide to whether someone will be a good chairperson.
As with other important positions, such as High Court judges, the public is not in a position to judge who should be the Governor-General and Deputy.
And there would be a considerable disadvantage in selecting the positions by direct election of the voters. How would an under-performing Governor-General or Deputy be removed? At elections, candidates are chosen to serve for a specific period of time. If the person chosen cannot control Parliament, we will have to wait for the period to expire, leaving Parliament dysfunctional in the meantime.
Appointment should be by each House of Parliament
The primary role of the Governor-General and Deputy suggests the method of selection. As the role is to preside over Parliament, they should be chosen by Parliament. Members of Parliament will be in the best position to judge whether the person is running debates smoothly and impartially.
For the Governor-General, the method of appointment set out in proposed s.58B is:
“The Governor-General:
(i) Shall be appointed for a term which expires no later than six months after the date of polling for the next general election of Members of the House; and
(ii) May be removed prior to the expiry of that term;
by a resolution passed by two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives who vote on the resolution. ”
For the Deputy Governor-General, the method of appointment set out in proposed s.59B is:
"The Deputy Governor-General:
(i) Shall be appointed for a term which expires no later than six months after the earliest polling day determined by the States for the next Senate election, whether that be an election for the whole Senate or half the Senate; and
(ii) May be removed prior to the expiry of that term;
by a resolution passed by two-thirds of the members of the Senate who vote on the resolution. ”
The two thirds requirement ensures that a candidate must be acceptable to a broad cross-section of Parliamentarians, not just the party which holds the majority. Removal of an incompetent Head of State can be achieved swiftly, if there is a consensus the incumbent has failed. With the House choosing the Governor-General and the Senate choosing the Deputy, power is spread between the two Houses, while confirming the Senate’s subordinate status.
Go to next chapter |
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