50 Rules and orders
Each House of the Parliament may make rules and orders with respect to:
(i) the mode in which its powers, privileges, and immunities may be exercised and upheld;
(ii) the order and conduct of its business and proceedings either separately or jointly with the other House.

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50 Standing orders
(1) Each House of the Parliament may make standing orders with respect to:
(i) the mode in which its powers, privileges, and immunities may be exercised and upheld;
(ii) the order and conduct of its business and proceedings either separately or jointly with the other House.
(2) The standing orders made pursuant to subsection (1) must:
(i) Provide that decisions made under the standing orders during proceedings in Parliament by any person presiding cannot be overruled otherwise than by a resolution passed by two-thirds of those voting on the resolution; and
(ii) Provide that upon a decision being made during proceedings in Parliament by the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General that:
    (a) A Minister has failed to adequately answer a question which the standing orders oblige the Minister to answer, the Minister must forfeit in favour of the Commonwealth one day’s worth of the Minister’s ministerial salary (but not allowances or other entitlements) for each such declaration; and
    (b) A Member of the House is suspended from the House, the Member must forfeit in favour of the Commonwealth the Member’s salary (but not allowances or other entitlements) as a Member of Parliament for the duration of the suspension.
For the purposes of sub-clause (ii)(a), “Minister” means the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State and any other member of the House who holds office in the Government or in the House.
(3) The High Court may, on the application of any elector, amend the standing orders so as to bring them into compliance with the requirements of this Constitution.

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50 Rules and orders Standing orders
(1) Each House of the Parliament may make rules and standing orders with respect to:
(i) the mode in which its powers, privileges, and immunities may be exercised and upheld;
(ii) the order and conduct of its business and proceedings either separately or jointly with the other House.
(2) The standing orders made pursuant to subsection (1) must:
(i) Provide that decisions made under the standing orders during proceedings in Parliament by any person presiding cannot be overruled otherwise than by a resolution passed by two-thirds of those voting on the resolution; and
(ii) Provide that upon a decision being made during proceedings in Parliament by the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General that:
    (a) A Minister has failed to adequately answer a question which the standing orders oblige the Minister to answer, the Minister must forfeit in favour of the Commonwealth one day’s worth of the Minister’s ministerial salary (but not allowances or other entitlements) for each such declaration; and
    (b) A Member of the House is suspended from the House, the Member must forfeit in favour of the Commonwealth the Member’s salary (but not allowances or other entitlements) as a Member of Parliament for the duration of the suspension.
For the purposes of sub-clause (ii)(a), “Minister” means the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of State and any other member of the House who holds office in the Government or in the House.
(3) The High Court may, on the application of any elector, amend the standing orders so as to bring them into compliance with the requirements of this Constitution.

50.1 This section will be substantially re-written through the introduction of an additional subsection (2), to implement one of the new arrangements designed to ensure impartial conduct by those chairing Parliamentary debates.
50.2 It is proposed to change the name of the section to ‘Standing Orders’. Quick and Garran at p.507 noted that the British Parliament divided its rules and orders into three types: standing orders, sessional rules and orders, and resolutions of indeterminate duration. There is no longer any reason to follow British practice. All types of rules can fall within the term standing orders - the Houses of Parliament simply have to make the effect and the duration of each rule clear. The name ‘Standing Orders’ is the term by which most people recognise such rules, so using that term makes the Constitution more comprehensible to ordinary voters. It also facilitates the drafting of the amendments proposed to s.50.
50.3 Subsection 50(2)(i) implements the requirement for a two-thirds majority to overturn decisions during Parliamentary debates. For consistency, the rule applies to any person who so presides, regardless of whether that is the Head of State or the Deputy Head of State or a Member of the House. Presiding over Parliament will become the primary roles of the Governor-General and Deputy, and they should not be absent often, except by reason of ill health.
50.4 Subsection 50(2)(i) refers to “decisions made during proceedings in Parliament”. The latter phrase is intended to limit the two-thirds majority requirement to decisions made on the floor of Parliament, and to exclude from the rule any decisions which the standing orders might authorise be made outside of Parliamentary debates. For example, decisions of an administrative nature made by the presiding officer would be liable to be overturned on a simple majority. The use of the identical expression in s.50(2)(ii) ensures that decisions under that subsection are also subject to the two-thirds rule in s.50(2)(i).
50.5 Subsection 50(2)(ii) will permit the Governor-General, who will generally preside in the House of Representatives, and the Deputy who will generally preside in the Senate, to impose  a new penalty on those who do not follow particular Standing Orders. This power will not be available to ordinary members of Parliament presiding in the absence of either the Governor-General or Deputy, because such members will usually be partisan political figures whose decisions on such matters are unlikely to be accepted by opposing members of Parliament, or the electorate, as easily as those made by the impartial figures the Governor-General and Deputy are intended to be.
50.6 The penalty may be imposed on Ministers who fail to “adequately answer” questions. This will be determined by the subjective judgment of the Governor-General or Deputy. A Minister who objects to the penalty would have two options. The first is referred to in s.50(2) - to seek to gain a two-thirds majority vote in favour of reversing the ruling. The second would arise from the duties imposed on the Governor-General in s.58A(i) and the Deputy in s.59A(i) to show “impartiality and fairness”. As duties, whether or not they have been discharged is justiciable before the High Court under the proposed new section 60A(1). The Minister’s second option therefore is to ask the High Court for a declaration that the imposition of the penalty was not a valid exercise of the power, either because the question had been answered, or the decision that it had not been was either not impartial or not fair.
50.7 The penalty on Ministers is only potentially available where the standing orders oblige the Minister to answer. If standing orders remain as presently drafted, no penalties will ever be imposed because there is no requirement for Ministers to answer questions. Standing order 104 merely requires answers to be “directly relevant” to the question. The content of the standing orders will continue to be determined by majority vote, which means that ordinarily a Government will have control over which questions, if any, must be answered. It may take some time for Governments to have the courage to impose on themselves an obligation to answer questions, but if this hurdle can be overcome the section should improve the standard of question time in both Houses of Parliament.
50.8 Subsection 50(2)(ii) also allows penalties to be imposed on unruly members who are suspended from each House. Again, the member would have the same two options for challenging the decision as a Minister would have, outlined at Note 50.6 above.
50.9 The amount of the penalty is set by reference to salary, but not allowances or other entitlements. The main sanction is the imposition of a penalty, not its size. The express reference to allowances and entitlements is more about clarifying the extent of the penalty than limiting its size.
50.10 The penalties are forfeitures. The intention is that the sums forfeited are never paid to the members. Unlike with the current s.46, the sums do not become a debt due. The proposed section extinguishes an entitlement to payment. The amount forfeited would not form part of the member’s taxable income.
50.11 Though not expressly mentioned in the section, the standing orders will have to conform with s.6, s.58A(i) and s.59A(i).
50.12 Subsection 50(3) provides a mechanism for requiring the standing orders to meet the requirements set out in the Constitution. The High Court, on the application of any elector, has a discretion to re-write the standing orders to ensure compliance with the Constitution.