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60B Acting Governor-General and Supplementary Provisions |
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Proposed Constitution |
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(1) Each House of Parliament may make standing orders to appoint a member or members of the House to preside over proceedings in the House during any period in which the office of either the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so preside.
(2) Parliament may make laws not inconsistent with this Constitution:
(i) Appointing persons to act on a temporary basis in place of the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General during any period in which either office is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so act, in the event of which appointment references in this Constitution to the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General shall be taken to refer to the person(s) so acting;
(ii) Defining the meaning of the terms vacancy, absence and inability in sections 58A(v), 59A(ii), 60B(1) and 60B(2)(i); and
(iii) Determining the remuneration and other entitlements of the Governor-General, Deputy Governor-General and any person acting in their positions, provided that such office holders must be liable to taxation in the same way as a Minister of State.
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All Changes Displayed |
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(1) Each House of Parliament may make standing orders to appoint a member or members of the House to preside over proceedings in the House during any period in which the office of either the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so preside.
(2) Parliament may make laws not inconsistent with this Constitution:
(i) Appointing persons to act on a temporary basis in place of the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General during any period in which either office is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so act, in the event of which appointment references in this Constitution to the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General shall be taken to refer to the person(s) so acting;
(ii) Defining the meaning of the terms vacancy, absence and inability in sections 58A(v), 59A(ii), 60B(1) and 60B(2)(i); and
(iii) Determining the remuneration and other entitlements of the Governor-General, Deputy Governor-General and any person acting in their positions, provided that such office holders must be liable to taxation in the same way as a Minister of State. |
Drafting Notes |
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60B.1 This new section provides for the appointment of persons to act in the place of the Head of State and Deputy.
60B.2 Since the role of presiding over debate in a House of Parliament is primarily of concern to the House affected, subsection 60B(1) permits the standing orders of each House to determine how proceedings will be managed in the absence of the Governor-General and/or Deputy. This will be the appropriate way of dealing with sittings of the Houses of lesser importance. Where however the Governor-General or Deputy is likely to be absent or unable to preside for an extended though temporary period, it may be necessary to appoint an Acting Head of State or Deputy. Legislation is the appropriate way to deal with such appointments.
60B.3 It has been customary for State Governors to stand in for the Governor-General when the latter is absent. This practice should be discontinued. The chief role of the Governor-General day to day will be to chair Parliamentary debates. This will require an extensive knowledge of Commonwealth Parliamentary procedure, which is likely to differ over time from that of the States. The States have Lieutenant Governors to act in place of their Governor. Usually this person is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This practice is a clear breach of the separation of powers, because it involves a judicial officer in the actions of the executive. (Currently our system is riddled with such contradictions and breaches of principle). After the introduction of the Advancing Democracy model, it would be a breach because it would involve a judicial officer in the proceedings of Parliament. The job of Governor-General will also involve some real work for a change, and it is doubtful any judge would have the time to do it while still undertaking judicial work.
60B.4 Subsection 60B(2)(ii) authorises Parliament to make laws defining “the meaning of the terms vacancy, absence and inability” in the new sections of the Constitution. It would be possible to include a definition of “inability” in the Constitution, but such a definition may prove inadequate over time. Parliamentarians will be those most directly affected by an inadequate performance of the roles of Head of State and Deputy, so they should be allowed over time to work out exactly which types of inability really matter. It may be that Parliament will provide a procedure for the Governor-General and Deputy to undergo medical assessment if their competence is in doubt. Parliament will not have a completely free hand to determine what ‘vacancy, absence or inability’ means. The introductory words to the section states that any such laws must be “not inconsistent with this Constitution”. If the legislative definition of ‘vacancy, absence or inability’ strayed too far from an ordinary meaning of those words, the legislation would be invalid as inconsistent with the Constitution. |
Proposed Constitution |
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(1) Each House of Parliament may make standing orders to appoint a member or members of the House to preside over proceedings in the House during any period in which the office of either the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so preside.
(2) Parliament may make laws not inconsistent with this Constitution:
(i) Appointing persons to act on a temporary basis in place of the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General during any period in which either office is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so act, in the event of which appointment references in this Constitution to the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General shall be taken to refer to the person(s) so acting;
(ii) Defining the meaning of the terms vacancy, absence and inability in sections 58A(v), 59A(ii), 60B(1) and 60B(2)(i); and
(iii) Determining the remuneration and other entitlements of the Governor-General, Deputy Governor-General and any person acting in their positions, provided that such office holders must be liable to taxation in the same way as a Minister of State.
< Previous section Next section > |
All Changes Displayed |
|
(1) Each House of Parliament may make standing orders to appoint a member or members of the House to preside over proceedings in the House during any period in which the office of either the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so preside.
(2) Parliament may make laws not inconsistent with this Constitution:
(i) Appointing persons to act on a temporary basis in place of the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General during any period in which either office is vacant, or either is absent or otherwise unable to so act, in the event of which appointment references in this Constitution to the Governor-General or Deputy Governor-General shall be taken to refer to the person(s) so acting;
(ii) Defining the meaning of the terms vacancy, absence and inability in sections 58A(v), 59A(ii), 60B(1) and 60B(2)(i); and
(iii) Determining the remuneration and other entitlements of the Governor-General, Deputy Governor-General and any person acting in their positions, provided that such office holders must be liable to taxation in the same way as a Minister of State. |
Drafting Notes |
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60B.1 This new section provides for the appointment of persons to act in the place of the Head of State and Deputy.
60B.2 Since the role of presiding over debate in a House of Parliament is primarily of concern to the House affected, subsection 60B(1) permits the standing orders of each House to determine how proceedings will be managed in the absence of the Governor-General and/or Deputy. This will be the appropriate way of dealing with sittings of the Houses of lesser importance. Where however the Governor-General or Deputy is likely to be absent or unable to preside for an extended though temporary period, it may be necessary to appoint an Acting Head of State or Deputy. Legislation is the appropriate way to deal with such appointments.
60B.3 It has been customary for State Governors to stand in for the Governor-General when the latter is absent. This practice should be discontinued. The chief role of the Governor-General day to day will be to chair Parliamentary debates. This will require an extensive knowledge of Commonwealth Parliamentary procedure, which is likely to differ over time from that of the States. The States have Lieutenant Governors to act in place of their Governor. Usually this person is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This practice is a clear breach of the separation of powers, because it involves a judicial officer in the actions of the executive. (Currently our system is riddled with such contradictions and breaches of principle). After the introduction of the Advancing Democracy model, it would be a breach because it would involve a judicial officer in the proceedings of Parliament. The job of Governor-General will also involve some real work for a change, and it is doubtful any judge would have the time to do it while still undertaking judicial work.
60B.4 Subsection 60B(2)(ii) authorises Parliament to make laws defining “the meaning of the terms vacancy, absence and inability” in the new sections of the Constitution. It would be possible to include a definition of “inability” in the Constitution, but such a definition may prove inadequate over time. Parliamentarians will be those most directly affected by an inadequate performance of the roles of Head of State and Deputy, so they should be allowed over time to work out exactly which types of inability really matter. It may be that Parliament will provide a procedure for the Governor-General and Deputy to undergo medical assessment if their competence is in doubt. Parliament will not have a completely free hand to determine what ‘vacancy, absence or inability’ means. The introductory words to the section states that any such laws must be “not inconsistent with this Constitution”. If the legislative definition of ‘vacancy, absence or inability’ strayed too far from an ordinary meaning of those words, the legislation would be invalid as inconsistent with the Constitution. |
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