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Chapter 12 - The Effect on the Balance of Power |
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Chapter 12 - The Effect on the Balance of Power
Unlike the 1999 proposal, the Advancing Democracy model is intended to affect the balance of power under our Constitution.
The Balance of Power Between the Houses of Parliament
By far the main change would be that the Senate would lose the power it exercised in 1975 to cause the Government which controls the House of Representatives to be removed. The main point of the proposal is to remove this power, thereby strengthening the House of Representatives against the pretensions of the less democratically elected Senate.
This is a long overdue reform which will advance democracy. It would confirm that the Government of Australia is responsible only to the House of Representatives, not to the whole Parliament.
Those inclined to reject the proposal for this reason should contemplate the alternative. If we have another crisis of 1975 proportions where the Senate attempts to remove the Government, the inevitable result will be that future Prime Ministers will simply appoint a tame Governor-General who can be relied on never to dismiss the Prime Minister - a party hack, or family member for example.
Under the model, the Senate would not however lose its power to defer or reject supply or any other money bill. It would still be possible for the Senate to reject a budget; for example, if the budget discriminated against particular States. The Senate would not therefore lose the power to defend the interests of the States.
Otherwise, the Senate gains slightly in power, in three ways.
Firstly, in a deadlock between the two Houses, it has been customary for the Governor-General to exercise his or her discretion under section 57 of the Constitution by following the advice of the Prime Minister. The Advancing Democracy model removes the Governor-General’s discretion, replacing it with an obligation to accede to any request by the House of Representatives to dissolve both Houses or hold a joint sitting.
Although circumstances will vary over time, it is likely that there will be fewer double dissolutions and joint sittings if all members of the lower house must participate in the deadlock procedure under s.57. To the extent to which that occurs, the Senate will be at less risk of having its rejection of legislation challenged by a double dissolution and joint sitting.
Secondly, the Senate gains the power to appoint the Deputy Governor-General, who at times will stand in for the Head of State. Presently the Senate has no role in the selection of the Governor-General.
Thirdly, the power of the executive to control Senate sitting times under section 5 will be removed. The Senate’s power to control its own proceedings will be confirmed in proposed s.6A.
All the Senate loses is a power it should never have had, and it makes some gains in return.
The Balance of Power Between the Executive and Legislature
A significant aspect of the Advancing Democracy proposal is that it would strengthen the powers of ordinary members of Parliament at the expense of the Government.
Principally this change would come from having an independent person chairing Parliamentary debates, rather than a Government-appointed Speaker, coupled with the new powers to be inserted into the standing orders which will impose consequences on Ministers who fail to answer questions they are obliged to answer under the standing orders. Of course, it will still be necessary for members to change the standing orders to impose those obligations, but provided this happens over time - it may not happen for the first few years - the executive’s abuse of its majority position during debates will be significantly curtailed. Ordinary members of Parliament would through questions to Ministers be able to exercise real power and influence over the Government.
Secondly, the power of the ordinary member of the House of Representatives will be enhanced through the House exercising the following powers which are now exercised by the Prime Minister or other Ministers:
▸ The power to call early elections;
▸ The power to determine meeting times for Parliament;
▸ The power to select the Governor-General;
▸ The power to call double dissolutions and joint sittings.
Thirdly, laws passed by Parliament could no longer be delayed or stymied by the executive advising the Governor-General not to assent to the legislation.
The Balance of Power Between the Commonwealth and States
The proposal involves no alteration to the federal balance between State and Commonwealth power.
The only impact on the position of the States comes through the new s.110A, under which the voters of a State could choose to change their State Constitution at the same time as the Commonwealth Constitution was changed.
Go to Appendices |
|
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Chapter 12 - The Effect on the Balance of Power
Unlike the 1999 proposal, the Advancing Democracy model is intended to affect the balance of power under our Constitution.
The Balance of Power Between the Houses of Parliament
By far the main change would be that the Senate would lose the power it exercised in 1975 to cause the Government which controls the House of Representatives to be removed. The main point of the proposal is to remove this power, thereby strengthening the House of Representatives against the pretensions of the less democratically elected Senate.
This is a long overdue reform which will advance democracy. It would confirm that the Government of Australia is responsible only to the House of Representatives, not to the whole Parliament.
Those inclined to reject the proposal for this reason should contemplate the alternative. If we have another crisis of 1975 proportions where the Senate attempts to remove the Government, the inevitable result will be that future Prime Ministers will simply appoint a tame Governor-General who can be relied on never to dismiss the Prime Minister - a party hack, or family member for example.
Under the model, the Senate would not however lose its power to defer or reject supply or any other money bill. It would still be possible for the Senate to reject a budget; for example, if the budget discriminated against particular States. The Senate would not therefore lose the power to defend the interests of the States.
Otherwise, the Senate gains slightly in power, in three ways.
Firstly, in a deadlock between the two Houses, it has been customary for the Governor-General to exercise his or her discretion under section 57 of the Constitution by following the advice of the Prime Minister. The Advancing Democracy model removes the Governor-General’s discretion, replacing it with an obligation to accede to any request by the House of Representatives to dissolve both Houses or hold a joint sitting.
Although circumstances will vary over time, it is likely that there will be fewer double dissolutions and joint sittings if all members of the lower house must participate in the deadlock procedure under s.57. To the extent to which that occurs, the Senate will be at less risk of having its rejection of legislation challenged by a double dissolution and joint sitting.
Secondly, the Senate gains the power to appoint the Deputy Governor-General, who at times will stand in for the Head of State. Presently the Senate has no role in the selection of the Governor-General.
Thirdly, the power of the executive to control Senate sitting times under section 5 will be removed. The Senate’s power to control its own proceedings will be confirmed in proposed s.6A.
All the Senate loses is a power it should never have had, and it makes some gains in return.
The Balance of Power Between the Executive and Legislature
A significant aspect of the Advancing Democracy proposal is that it would strengthen the powers of ordinary members of Parliament at the expense of the Government.
Principally this change would come from having an independent person chairing Parliamentary debates, rather than a Government-appointed Speaker, coupled with the new powers to be inserted into the standing orders which will impose consequences on Ministers who fail to answer questions they are obliged to answer under the standing orders. Of course, it will still be necessary for members to change the standing orders to impose those obligations, but provided this happens over time - it may not happen for the first few years - the executive’s abuse of its majority position during debates will be significantly curtailed. Ordinary members of Parliament would through questions to Ministers be able to exercise real power and influence over the Government.
Secondly, the power of the ordinary member of the House of Representatives will be enhanced through the House exercising the following powers which are now exercised by the Prime Minister or other Ministers:
▸ The power to call early elections;
▸ The power to determine meeting times for Parliament;
▸ The power to select the Governor-General;
▸ The power to call double dissolutions and joint sittings.
Thirdly, laws passed by Parliament could no longer be delayed or stymied by the executive advising the Governor-General not to assent to the legislation.
The Balance of Power Between the Commonwealth and States
The proposal involves no alteration to the federal balance between State and Commonwealth power.
The only impact on the position of the States comes through the new s.110A, under which the voters of a State could choose to change their State Constitution at the same time as the Commonwealth Constitution was changed.
Go to Appendices |
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